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The Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002:
Promoting a Multi-Jurisdictional Policy
JESSE

M.

KEENAN'

In recent years, King County, including the City of Seattle,
Washington has been a "Showcase Community" for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 2 This community, together
with public and private entities, formed an Environmental Extension Service ("EES") in March 1988 as part of the EPA's
Brownfields Showcase Community Program. 3 The function of this
program was to demonstrate cooperation with federal, state, local
and private entities, as they pursue and implement a comprehen4
sive local strategy for redeveloping brownfield sites.
The EES served as a center point by which the community
could do everything from assessing sites to leveraging funding to
capitalize remediation loans. In fact, the Seattle EES leveraged
over $1.5 million from private funding alone to assess and remediate local sites.
The Seattle program demonstrates a real policy trend in the
EPA regarding the redevelopment of brownfields. The policy of the
EPA, in recent years, has been to address the redevelopment of
brownfields with a multi-jurisdictional element, by giving state
and local governments an expanded role. This article examines
the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act ("the Act")5 in light of this policy trend. This examination
will focus on state and local governments' new roles, as refined in
1. Jesse M. Keenan, J.D. received his B.A. from the University of Georgia, J.D.
from Georgia State University, and is an L.L.M. candidate in Real Property Development at the University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Colin Crawford at Georgia State University for his assistance in preparation of

this work.
2. EPA, King County/Seattle: Reclaiming Industrial Lands, 500-F-02-165 (Dec.
2002), at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/pdf/ss-seatl.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9604, 9605, 9607, and
9622(g)(2002)).
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the Act, which is consistent with an overall policy trend towards
the implementation of a multi-jurisdictional element. This article
will examine the key provisions of the Act, including the liability
provisions as they relate to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), as well
as the funding provisions within the Act itself.
The author takes the position in the first portion of the article
that the Act helps facilitate a shift towards the state clean-up programs and away from the federally administered programs. In
addition, the author takes the position in the second portion of the
article that state and local governments, particularly local governments, are now able to take an expanding role in redevelopment
through a series of funding opportunities under the Act. Subsequently, it is the overall position of the author that the Act is consistent with an overall policy, which dictates that state and local
governments take an ever-expanding role in brownfield development through the implementation of a multi-jurisdictional policy.
Before turning to an examination of the provisions of the Act,
it is beneficial to take a brief look at the nature of the brownfield
redevelopment problems that lead to the passage of the Act. Toxic
substances contaminating brownfields represent one of the most
elusive regulatory problems affecting land use.6 Toxic contaminants, through their widespread use and migrating properties,
know no boundaries or jurisdictional limits. In addition, the public health ramifications from widespread exposure to toxic contaminants are truly daunting. 7 One area which is most relevant
to the intersection of toxic regulation and land use, is brownfield
redevelopment.
Brownfields are essentially pieces of property, typically in urban areas, which are either being used for low intensity use or no
use at all. The reasons for such inactivity usually rest upon the
tremendous liability that comes along with the prospective
purchase of such properties under CERCLA.8 Brownfields are not
only an aesthetic blight upon the urban landscape, but the
problems of such sites, ranging from health to environmental jus6. See

S.

APPLEGATE, ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND
40-46 (2000).
7. See George W. C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of
Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227 (1993).
8. See Nicholas Capuano, Silent Blight: New York's Brownfields & Environmental Justice, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811 (2003).
JOHN

HAZARDOUS WASTE
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tice concerns, are far reaching.9 The environmental consequences
range from the immediacy of potential toxic exposure 10 of surrounding communities to the proliferation of suburban sprawl."
For these reasons and many others, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has made brownfield development a major initiative. 12 In fact,
the EPA estimates that there are between 500,000 and 1,000,000
3
brownfield sites in the U.S. alone.'
Subsequently, local governments' interests in cleaning up
brownfields are not purely aesthetic. The U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that brownfield redevelopment could generate up to
$2.4 billion in tax revenues. 14 So, when President George W.
Bush signed a new piece of brownfields development legislation
into law on January 11, 2002, it was touted not only as a tool for
cleaning up the environment, but also as a powerful new tool towards revitalizing the urban areas where labor workforces had
been hit disproportionately hard by the downturn in the
economy. 15
It was in this political context that the Act materialized in
response to the ever growing challenges and problems related to
brownfield development. As previously noted, the liability scheme
under CERCLA is the most crucial legal hurdle to overcome for
potential developers and state and local governments in their pursuit of redeveloping a brownfield site.1 6 The Act was heralded by
many to be a major step in the right direction in clearing up many
of the issues resulting in CERCLA litigation, which is often a ma9. Id. ; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L.
1060, 1073-74 (1991).
10. John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243,
247-48 (1998).
11. Joel B. Eisen, A Case Study of Sustainable Development: Brownfields, 32
REV.

ENVTL. L. REP. 10,420 (2002).

12. Major Provisions of H.R. 2869 - The Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, at http://www.usmayors.org/uscmlus-mayor-newspaper/documents/01_14 02/brownfields2.asp (last modified Jan. 14, 2002).
13. President Signs Legislation to Clean the Environment & Create Jobs, at http:/
/www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_011102.htm (last modified June 8, 2004) [hereinafter President Signs Legislation]; Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.L. 107-118. See generally Thomas, Legislative History on the
Internet, at http:/thomas.loc.gov/ (providing the full text of the brownfield amendment and legislative history).
14. President Signs Legislation, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Michael B. Gerrard, et al., We Shall Be Released: New Forms of Legal Protection, 499 PRACTICING L. INST. REAL EST. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 759
(2003).
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jor impediment to brownfields development. 1 7 In addition, the Act
provided consistent funds that capitalize brownfield redevelopment for years to come.' 8
The Act will have a far reaching impact on state and local
governments, as well as developers, who aspire to revitalize these
idle land uses. 19 In order to fully understand the local land use
implications of the Act, it is necessary to first examine the key
elements of it in terms of the alteration of the liability scheme
under CERCLA. It should be noted that CERCLA does not preempt state analog legislation. 20 In fact, it has been noted that
"[s]ubtitle C of the Act specifically limits the federal government's
authority to pursue administrative or judicial action against an
owner or operator when that person's land already is undergoing
cleanup pursuant to a state-approved plan."2 1 States are left with
a great deal of room in terms of setting their own land use policies
in regard to brownfields. 22 In fact, states in theory may choose to
implement and amend their own analog legislation. Ultimately,
states may have the same criticisms of the Act that have been
noted by some practitioners in the field. 2 3 It should be noted that
even prior to the passage of the Act, the states already had considerable leverage in dictating what sites should be cleaned up. In
1995, the EPA provided states with State Memoranda Agreements that allowed parties engaged in voluntary cleanup with the
state to be exempt from further liability via a suit by the EPA, if
24
such parties fully complied with state remedial standards.
17. 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,890 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Reid); Lawrence P. Schnapf, New Solutions to Environmental Problems in Business &
Real Estate Deals 2003: Due Diligence in Corporate Transactions,499 PRACTICING L.
INST. REAL EST. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 175 (2003).
18. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9604(k) (Supp. I 2001).
19. See Adrienne G. Southgate & Susan B. Kaplan, Brownfields Law Takes
Center Stage, 51 R.I.B.J. 3:13(May/June 2003).
20. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (W.D. Wash.
1990).
21. Heather D. Vandenberg, The Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001: New
Hope for Urban Development, 23 A.B.A. CONSTRUCTION LAW 39 (2003).
22. See Flannary P. Collins, Note: The Small Business and Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 303 (2003).
23. See Robert P. Dahlquist & Tiffany A. Barzal, Ah, Relief from CERCLA, But
Where is the Relief?, 12 A.B.A. Bus. L. TODAY 39 (2003).
24. Amy L. Edwards, InstitutionalControls: The Converging Worlds of Real Estate and Environmental Law and the Role of the Uniform Environmental Covenant
Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2003).
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Despite CERCLA's lack of preemption and the pre-existing
state memoranda policy, the new liability scheme under the Act is
still relevant in terms of current local land use practices to the
extent that liability is often one of the primary issues preventing
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Arguably, the most facially
controversial section of the Act is the de micromis exemption for
25
small businesses.
Prior to the Act, the EPA had the statutory authority under
CERCLA section 122(g) 26 to settle with de micromis contributors,
but settlement did not equal an exemption from liability. 2 7 Subsequently, under the Act, 28 parties who contribute, whether it be by
disposing, treating, or transporting, less than 200 pounds of solid
hazardous waste or less than 110 pounds of liquid material are
exempt from liability. 2 9 This exemption only applies to sites on the
National Priority List ("NPL"). 30 In addition to the limitation that
the exemption be applied only in the context of a NPL site, the
exemption will not apply if it is determined that (1) the materials
could or did contribute significantly to the cost of the remediation
of a site; or (2) the person or entity failed to comply with an information request of an administrative subpoena; or (3) the person
or entity was convicted of a criminal violation for the conduct for
31
which the exemption would apply.
These exemption provisions have a direct consequence on parties opting to remediate under state programs, in lieu of a federally administered program. Considering the relatively few sites
that are on the NPL in comparison to the total number of contaminated sites, including brownfields, this is a toothless exemption.
Again, despite this de micromis exemption, CERCLA liability is
still by and large preserved as a powerful leveraging tool for states
that choose to set their own prerogative in state remedial actions.
Therefore, parties will be more inclined to remediate their sites
under state plans, instead of possibly relying, if qualified, on
toothless exemptions in the Act.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(o) (Sui.p. I 2001).
26. Id. § 9622(g) (2000).
27. See ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.11
(1992 & Supp. 2003).
28. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-118 § 102, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(o)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 9607(o)(1).
31. Id. § 9607(o)(2).

5
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In addition, there is another exemption for small businesses
contributing to municipal solid waste sites on the NPL. 3 2 Unlike
the de micromis exemption, this exemption has no reference to
limitations on specific amounts of material. 33 The implications of
this exemption for small businesses could have a marked effect on
state and local governments. This exemption, and others, could
limit the tools by which local municipalities and authorities imple34
ment site clean-up, at least in terms of joint and several liability.
It can be argued that if the exemptions are easy to obtain, then
parties may gravitate towards a federally administered cleanup.
However, if the exemptions are difficult to obtain, like many other
exemptions and defenses under CERCLA, then parties may gravitate toward state administered cleanups.
In addition to the de micromis exemption and the solid waste
35
exemptions, the Act allows for a contiguous land owner defense.
Again, an examination of these exemptions is relevant to the extent that parties may opt to remediate under state administered
plans, because of the problems associated with such exemptions
and defenses. In the case where a property owner contiguous to a
contaminated piece of property finds that her property has been
contaminated, the contiguous landowner is not considered an
owner or operator for liability purposes under section 9607(a)(1) or
(2).36 Some commentators have noted that this defense is rather
limited in two regards. First, it only applies to water contamination, and does not address soil leaching. 3 7 Second, this new addition is slightly futile in the sense that there was already a thirdparty defense available to upgradient property owners that does
not require due diligence or cooperation with the EPA. 38 Nonethe32. Id. § 9607(p).
33. Id.
34. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding parties to be joint and severally liable under CERCLA).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q).
36. Id. § 9607 (q)(1)(A).
37. Timothy Harmon & Karen Williams, Brownfields Revitalization Act: Big
Promises Not Delivered in New Brownfields Law, ENVIRONS (Summer 2002) (suggesting the Brownfields Act fails to live up to its promises), available at http:ll
www.lanepowell.com/pressroom/newsletters/detail.asp?xnltypeid=12&nlid=318;
See
Spencer M. Wiegard, The Brownfields Act: Providing Relieffor the Innocent or New
Hurdles to Avoid CERCLA Liability?, 28 WM.& MARY ENVTL.L.& POL'Y REV. 127
(2003).
38. Anthony R. Chase, et. al, CERCLA: Convey to a Pauperand Avoid Cost Recovery under Section 107(A)(1)?, 33 ENVTL. L. 393 (2001)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)
and (B), and noting that 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) also requires the purchaser to "establish that it exercised due care once it became aware of the contamination"); Scott
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less, the Act has established a series of elements that must be
meet in order to claim this defense: (1) the person did not contribute to the release; (2) the person is not related to the party responsible for the contamination; (3) the person took reasonable steps to
prevent any further contamination; (4) the person provides full cooperation with the authorities; (5) the person does not impede the
remediation process; and (6) the person is in compliance with all
land use restrictions. 3 9
This final requirement is of particular importance, to the extent that it provides a greater role for local governments in the
remediation process. The implications of requiring a potential
party or contiguous ]and owner to be in compliance with local land
use restrictions are not entirely clear. However, this does appear
to give the local land use authorities a tremendous amount of indirect power in dictating the liability of this potential party. 40 For
example, a local government may view the contiguous property
owner as part of the overall problem and potentially responsible
for the contamination, even though the EPA or state regulators
may not have made such a finding. The local government could
therefore rezone the property, and hence subject the contiguous
property owner to liability because the property owner would be,
for illustrative purposes, in possession of a facility which is a nonconforming use. 4 1 Nevertheless, local politics could dictate just
the opposite result. Subsequently, this final element, requiring
that the contiguous land owner be in compliance with local land
use restrictions, shifts much of the decision making power to the
local government.
In addition to the previously mentioned requirements, the
contiguous property owner who claims the new defense must show
that she made "all [the] appropriate inquiries" at the time she
purchased the property, and did not have any knowledge of the
Reisch, The Brownfields Amendments: New Opportunities, New Challenges-PartI,
31 COLO. LAW. 99, 101 (June 2002); Heather D. Vandenberg, The Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001: New Hope for Urban Development, 23 A.B.A. CONSTRUCTION LAW
39 (2003).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A) (Supp. I 2001).
40. See EPA Memorandum OSWER Directive Number: 9355.7-04, at http://
www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/landuse.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (encouraging discussions among local land use planning authorities and communities to be conducted early in the site assessment process. This directive ensures that site remedies
meeting future land use objectives and protecting human health and the environment
are selected).
41. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THoMAs E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.31 (2003).
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contamination. 4 2 Regarding the application of an "all appropriate
inquiries", one commentator has noted that the "new contiguous
property owner exemption [has] the same standard that has been
in place for many years for a different CERCLA liability exemption - the innocent purchaser exemption. The innocent purchaser
exemption has proven to be, for all practical purposes, very difficult to effectively assert."4 3 Again, if the defense is difficult to obtain, then parties may gravitate away from federally administered
cleanups and towards state administered cleanups, which offer
protection through State Memoranda Agreements.
The crux of the problem in asserting the contiguous property
owner defense revolves around the property owner's conundrum;
if she finds the contamination she looses her defense, and if she
does not find the contamination it can be argued that she did not
comply with the "all appropriate inquiries" requirement. 4 4 However, the Act 4 5 directs the EPA to publish regulations defining
"all appropriate inquiries," and on May 9, 2003 the EPA attempted to clarify some of the underlying issues regarding this
46
rather ambigious language.
The federal regulations clarifying the "all appropriate standard" are modeled on the American Society for Testing Materials
("ASTM") phase I assessment.4 7 Although there is some uniformity in the standard, there may not always be uniformity in the
application of the test, since it is a subjective assessment done by
an environmental professional that does not require soil or water
samples to be taken from the site. 48 Subsequently, considering
how difficult it may be for the contiguous land owner to claim this
defense, it appears that these changes introduced by the Act have
done little to change the overall liability structure of CERCLA,
which may have the indirect effect of driving parties towards a
state-administered cleanup.
An additional liability release stemming from the Act, which
relates to the "all appropriate inquiries" language is the release of
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(viii) (Supp. I 2001).
43. Dahlquist, supra note 23.

44. Id.
45. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act, Pub. Law
No. 107-118 § 223.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1 2001); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 312.1 (2004); 68 Fed.Reg.
24,888 (June 9, 2003) (clarifying innocent landowner defense).
47. Id.
48. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss1/2
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Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers. 49 A buyer of land purchased
after the Act's enactment who conducted all appropriate inquiries
into the prior uses of the property and subsequently found contamination is exempted from liability,50 assuming the prospective
purchaser has made all required disclosures, prevented any further contamination, used due care with any releases, and did not
51
interfere with any institutional controls for remediation. This
exemption for those property owners who bought property after
discovering that it was contaminated effectively eliminates the
52
need for prospective purchaser agreements with the EPA.
The uncertainty of the bona fide prospective purchaser defense, and others, is significant to the extent that it deters parties
from opting to remediate under a federally administered plan. It
could be argued that this defense will be difficult to attain,5 3 leaving parties more inclined to avail themselves to state oversight
rather than federal oversight. It may be less risky for a party to
seek a state prospective purchase agreement rather than attempt
to use the federal affirmative defense of a bona fide purchaser.
With the prospective purchaser agreement the party will know exactly how much their liability will be, and such a state agreement
cannot be preempted by the federal statute. 54 In addition, there is
a transactional litigation cost associated with the federal statutory scheme because the bona fide purchaser exemption is an affirmative defense, and this may be an additional reason that
parties may opt to clean up sites under state supervision. 55 Another reason that parties may opt for a state prospective purchaser agreement is that under CERCLA section 107(r), if the
government has un-recovered cleanup costs and the fair market
value of the property has increased after the remediation process,

49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r) (Supp. I 2001).
50. Id. § 9607(r)(1).
51. Id. § 9601(40)(C) - (F).
52. Spencer M. Wiegard, The BrownfieldsAct: ProvidingRelief for the Innocent or
New Hurdles to Avoid CERCLA Liability?, 28 WM.& MARY ENVTL. L.& POL'Y REV.
127, 149 (2003).
53. Id.
54. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 783 F. Supp.1339, 1343 (W.D.
Wash. 1990).
55.

RONALD H. ROSENBERG, COMMUNITY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR BROWNFIELDS RE.

DEVELOPMENT 27 (2d ed. 2002)(citing Office of Solid Waste and Remedial Response,
Environmental Protection Agency, No. 542-B-97-001, Tool Kit of Information Resources for Brownfields Investigation and Cleanup (1997)).
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then the government can put a lien on the property to recover
56
such a cost.
However, what determines fair market value? There are a
variety of methods by which a certified and licensed commercial
appraiser could appraise a piece of property. Appraisers will look
at like and best uses, book values, and discounted cash flow methods.5 7 At the same time, they will try to reconcile the multiple valuation techniques. 58 But certainly one important, if not crucial,
factor for determining the valuation of a piece of property is the
tax value.5 9 Tax valuation is done primarily done through the
county or local jurisdiction's tax assessors office. This raises several key points. First, it could be assumed that these local bureaucratic institutions are highly susceptible to local political
pressures, and therefore the objectiveness of their valuation techniques are often questionable and not uniform. 60 Second, the tax
commissioners are often elected officials, and are susceptible to
particular political pressures. 6 1 Third, and most importantly, the
policy of the tax offices are almost always dictated by the local
government. This implies that local governments will have a great
deal of power to control the indeterminate financial liability of a
redevelopment project. 62 However, it is important to keep in mind
that state legislators often have the ultimate say in ad valorem
taxation for real property. 6 3 The State of Georgia has even passed
legislation addressing the issue of fair market valuation for
brownfield property, 6 4 giving preferential assessment to owners of
brownfield property. 65 Nevertheless, the county board of tax assessors retains some vested discretion in the granting of preferential tax assessment for brownfield properties. 6 6 Again, financial
stability and predictability are reasons why developers would
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(2) (Supp. 1 2001); Walter Mugdan, et. al, The Small Business and Liability Relief and Brownfields RevitalizationAct: A Summary and Discussion, SH058 ALI-ABA 117 (Feb. 12-14, 2003).
57. GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 600-11 (Lexis Law Publishing
1999).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Anthony Downs, Today's AppraisalsAre Unreliable, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR Feb. 1992, at 46.
61. LEFCOE, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-2(3)(F)(2004).
65. Id. § 48-5-7.6.
66. Id. § 48-5-7.6(c).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss1/2

10

20051 PROMOTING A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL POLICY 49
choose to contract to limit their liability under a state plan, which
cannot be preempted by federal statute. 67 As a result, states retain a greater, ever expanding role in brownfield development.
In addition to modifications of and amendments to CERCLA,
the Act also provides a long-awaited infusion of funding to facilitate the redevelopment process for brownfield development. 68 The
Act offers an unprecedented new role for local governments. Local
governments now have the financial tools and the opportunity to
work with developers and private citizens in a capacity that transcends the conventional role of local government.
The Act provides for three important types of funding which
local governments and redevelopment authorities may utilize: (1)
clean up grants, (2) revolving loan fund grants, and (3) assessment grants. 69 In fact, the Act provides for up to $200 million a
year for the funding of such grants. 70 This allotted expenditure is
up almost 100% from the 2002 brownfields funding allocations, of
approximately $98 million. 7 1 However, if the EPA is correct in determining that there are close to one million brownfield sites in
the U.S., then this funding allocation is just a drop in the bucket
in the overall cost of locating, identifying, assessing, and cleaning
72
up brownfields.
Before looking at the available funding options which increase state and local governments' involvement in the remediation process, it should be noted that local governments are
73
statutorily included as eligible for the different grant programs.
In fact, the Act envisions some sort of quasi-governmental entity,
which could handle, supervise, and perhaps fund a redeveloped
brownfield site.7 4 This local entity may very well be the platform
to most efficiently coordinate and take advantage of the
brownfields funding allocation.
One might assume that the clean up grant itself would be the
backbone of the brownfields funding allocation; however, it is not.
The statute mandates that each applicant may only apply for and
receive a one time $200,000 grant, which is to be used exclusively
67. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339 at 1343 (W.D.
Wash. 1990).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k) (Supp. I 2001).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. § 9604(k)(12).
President Signs Legislation, supra note 13.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(1) (Supp. I 2001).
Id. § 9604(k)(1)(B).
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for remediation purposes. 75 Obviously, this is just a drop in the
bucket when viewed in proportion to the total expenditures required to remediate most contaminated sites; however, the appli76
cant may apply for up to five sites.
There are two important implications for local governments
under the cleanup or remediation grants. First, the applicant
77
must own the land and contribute at least 20% of the cost share.
This may help local governments who actually own the site, but it
does nothing for local governments who are actively involved in
trying to clean up sites owned by private individuals and developers. Second, in October of 2003, the EPA published proposed regulations establishing the criteria that will be used to establish the
priority in releasing the funding under the grant program. 78 The
criteria for remediation grants include a series of factors that give
preference to sites that the local government has given the green
light and projects where the local government is taking an active
role in the overall cleanup process. 7 9 This gives local government,
and perhaps quasi-governmental authorities, a tremendous
amount of power in dictating not only potential liability, as discussed previously, but also in dictating the financial pro forma viability of proposed development projects.
The next funding program available under the Act is the
80
brownfield site characterization and assessment grant program.
This program provides for "grants to [be used to] inventory, characterize, assess, and conduct planning related to brownfield
sites."8 ' The EPA may award up to a $200,000 grant to each applicant per site; however, this amount may be increased to $350,000
when considering factors such as size and level of contamination
of the site.8 2 Unlike the remediation grants, this grant program
has no ownership requirements, which means that local govern75. Id. § 9604(k)(3)(A)(ii).
76. EPA, Brownfields Application Information, EPA-500-F-02-142 (Feb. 2004)
available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/applicat.htm#pg.(last modified Feb. 10,
2004).
77. Scott Reisch & Catherine M. VanHeuven, "DirtyMoney": EPA Issues Brownfield Grant Guidelines, 32 COLO. LAW. 69, 70 (2003).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k); Announcement of Proposal Deadlines for the Competition
for the 2004 National Brownfields Assessment, Revolving Loan Fund, and Cleanup
Grants, 68 Fed. Reg. 59,611 (Oct. 16, 2003).
79. 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,613.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(2) (Supp. I 2001).
81. Id. § 9604(k)(2)(A)(i).
82. Id. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(i)(I).
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ment could receive funding under this program for a variety of use
83
in regards to brownfield planning and assessment.
Although the grant program seems to provide "deep pockets of
money" for local government use, there are two catches. First, local governments may not use more than 10% of the funding they
receive from grants to (1) monitor the health of populations exposed to one or more hazardous substances from a brownfield sites
and (2) monitor and enforce any institutional control used to prevent human exposure to any hazardous substance from a brownfield site.8 4 This provision appears to strip some power away from
local governments, and it seems perplexing that the federal government would limit the ability of local governments to protect the
health and safety of their citizenry. Second, no money from the
grant may be used towards administrative costs.85 Thus the costs
of applying for the grants may prove to be cost prohibitive in light
of the cost burden that the local government must bear in just
applying for the grant.8 6 It is important to remember with these
grant programs that just because an entity applies for the grant
does not mean they are going to receive the funding, so it is a bit of
gamble for local governments to take in terms of paying for the
grant proposal.
The final funding program available under the Act is the Revolving Loan Fund Grant.8 7 Applicants are allowed to apply for up
to $1 million to capitalize a revolving loan, which is used for the
development or remediation of a brownfield project.8 8 In addition,
applicants may pool their applications together to be used in concert for one specific site.8 9 This allows local governments to take
the initiative and coordinate developers and private citizens, at
least in terms of financing a redevelopment project.
83. Id. § 9604(k)(1).
84. Id. § 9604(k)(4)(C).

85. Id. § 9604(k)(4)(B)(i)(III).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(ii)(III) (Supp. I 2001).
88. EPA, Proposal Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment, Revolving Loan Fund,
and Cleanup Grants, EPA-500-F-03-244 (Oct. 2002) available at http://www.epa.gov/
swerosps/bf/pgfy04-proposal-guidelines.htm (last modified Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter EPA, Proposal Guidelines]. As a side note, grants under the Brownfield Act may
be used to cleanup and assess sites contaminated by petroleum, which as been long
excluded under CERCLA. See Capuano, supra note 8. It is an interesting policy implication under the Bush administration, which has close ties to the oil industry, that
the government is funding, or at least helping to fund, the clean up of petroleum sites.
89. EPA, Proposal Guidelines, supra note 88.
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In fact, a specific quasi-governmental agency could be set up
to handle such coordination, as envisioned by the statute. 90 Of
course, the catch is that the applicants must share a certain percentage of the cost in proportion to the overall capitalization of the
loans. 9 1 However, local governments would be well suited to internalize the externalities of this requirement by providing services,
labor, and expertise, which is an invaluable asset that many private citizens would not be able to utilize. 92 In addition, local governments would be able to distribute, in subgrants, a percentage
of the excess funds not being used in a revolving loan fund, which
is a minimum of 60%. 9 3 Of course, this gives local governments
more power and control over the entire financial feasibility of the
redevelopment.
State and local governments, under the Act, have more and
more control and power over the process of brownfield redevelopment. First, the Act indirectly facilitates a move away from federally administered cleanups to state administered programs. This
shift is due to the difficult application of exemptions and defenses
under the Federal statutory scheme, and the predictability under
state programs. 94 As previously noted, key liability provisions
under CERCLA have been largely preserved, in light of the toothless new exemptions and defenses under the Act, which may be
difficult to obtain. In addition, several provisions make it more
cost efficient for developers and private citizens to gravitate towards state cleanup statutes, which are not subject to federal preemption. Subsequently, the funding provisions under the Act,
although somewhat limited in scope, allow for unprecedented
partnerships from which state and local governments can facilitate and dictate the financial feasibility of site redevelopment. Although some have argued that the uneasy relationship between
the EPA and state-led programs will lead to more and more developers neglecting to develop brownfield sites, 95 the reality is that
market forces in the land speculation market will ultimately dictate that brownfields will be developed, whether it be urban infill
90. President Signs Legislation, supra note 13.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(a) (Supp. I 2001).
92. See generally id.
93. EPA, Proposal Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment, Revolving Loan Fund,
and Cleanup Grants, $60-F-04-253 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov
swerospslbf/pgguidelines_2005.htm#sectionl (last modified Oct. 1, 2004).
94. However, it must be noted that some states may have much more stringent
liability schemes as compared with other states.
95. Dahlquist, supra note 23.
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or large scale suburban like development. Nevertheless, it is the
position of the author that state and local governments are taking
an ever expanding role in Brownfield development through a
multi-jurisdictional policy, which the Act indirectly promotes.
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